Trump is set to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE this week. Officially, the primary purpose of his visit is bilateral issues – investments, a rumored AI chips deal, and weapons sales, while the topic of nuclear negotiations with Iran is also expected to come up.
This intended bilateral focus, however, will likely be overshadowed by Netanyahu’s announcement that Israel is set to launch a massive operation in Gaza that aims to flatten and reoccupy the entire Strip, displacing Gazans yet again, while encouraging Palestinians to leave “voluntarily.” The assault, reportedly scheduled to begin immediately after Trump departs the region, would represent a major setback not only for the President, who has repeatedly pledged to end the war in Gaza, but also for his Gulf counterparts, who have been similarly pushing for a permanent ceasefire.
The release of Edan Alexander, the last American hostage held in Gaza, serves as a potential opening to advance negotiations toward an extended ceasefire and the eventual end of the war. For Netanyahu, it can be framed as a vindication of the maximum pressure strategy – justifying continued military escalation. At the same time, with no remaining American hostages, Washington’s incentive to sustain its mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas may significantly diminish after the President’s visit to the region as the spotlight heads elsewhere.
Nevertheless, Israel’s decision to signal that its invasion will begin only after Trump’s visit to the region suggests that Netanyahu’s announcement may just be an attempt to regain President Trump’s waning attention and steer him toward brokering a new ceasefire deal. According to reports, senior Israeli officials and generals, including IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, hope that preparing for an unprecedentedly large and destructive invasion of Gaza will pressure Hamas into accepting a truce with terms more favorable to Israel. By aligning the operation’s timing with Trump’s Gulf tour, Israeli officials are likely also counting on the President to leverage his relations with the Gulf States to bring Israel back from the brink of a cruel, and likely futile invasion of Gaza that would endanger the lives of the 21 living Israeli hostages (according to unofficial reports), and countless Palestinian civilians.
President Trump should use his Gulf visit to convince Qatar to pressure Hamas into accepting a ceasefire that is also acceptable to Israel, which will include the release of all hostages. Similarly, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia should take advantage of Trump’s likely urgency to prevent an Israeli escalation, and leverage it to push the President to endorse the Arab League-backed Egyptian framework for Gaza’s post-war governance and reconstruction. Trump, in turn, could leverage the Gulf States’ urgency to avert an Israeli escalation to extract a formal commitment from the Gulf States to take a more active role in Gaza’s post-war security and governance. Trump should work toward forming a strong Arab coalition capable of delivering a transformative impact, building on the Arab League initiative. This effort must be paired with a firm stance against Hamas’s future role in governance and a clear objective to disarm Hamas and all other terrorist groups in Gaza. The coalition will need to take responsibility for Gaza – including deploying forces on the ground – while supporting the Palestinian Authority during its reform process, and facilitating Saudi-Israeli normalization.
Simultaneously, the United States must make it equally clear that it is responsible for driving a shift in Israeli policy. This shift must entail ending the war, lifting the veto on Palestinian Authority participation in Gaza, and embracing a trajectory toward a future two-state solution.
The results of the visit, especially in light of the release of Alexander, may also affect Riyadh’s appetite to elevate the upcoming Saudi-French peace summit – focused on advancing a two-state solution and Palestinian statehood at the UN in June. Such a shift toward multilateral diplomacy that bypasses Washington’s traditional centrality could complicate Trump’s efforts to shape Gaza’s post-war future on his terms and signal a growing divergence between US and Gulf approaches to regional stabilization.
Shifting away from Gaza, the trip will likely underscore the extent to which Israeli interests have shifted down the Administration’s list of foreign policy priorities. The trip will undoubtedly include discussions of the US ongoing negotiations on a possible nuclear deal with Iran – negotiations to which Israel’s leaders are strongly opposed. The Saudis, meanwhile, strongly favor a nuclear deal with Iran, and have even sought to mediate the talks. Combined with Trump agreeing to a ceasefire with the Houthis that omitted any commitment from the group to halt attacks on Israel – according to some reports following Saudi lobbying efforts – as well as the President’s decision in April to wave off an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, the negotiations represent a significant departure from the near-perfect alignment between Trump and Netanyahu during the President’s first term. This departure undoubtedly alarms the Israeli Prime Minister.
Similarly alarming, not only to Israel’s Prime Minister, but also to those who have hinged their hopes of an end to the war in Gaza on the prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization is the expected announcement of a $100 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia and civil nuclear cooperation talks during the visit. The extensive arms package deal and green lighting of civil nuclear cooperation talks – once seen as a linchpin for regional normalization – are now unfolding as a standalone transaction, signaling that normalization with Israel is no longer viewed as strategically viable or diplomatically urgent. If the Trump Administration still viewed normalization as achievable in the near-future, it would have sought to leverage these advancements to negotiate more favourable terms for a wider normalization agreement, rather than offering them in a one-off agreement.
Despite the decreased prospect for a normalization agreement, and the apparent deprioritization of Israel for Trump in general, the Administration should continue to seek to deepen unofficial ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Trump Administration should encourage increased private sector cooperation, including technological ventures, commercial links, and tourism, while continuing to deepen the two countries’ cooperation on critical security matters. By bringing the two states closer together, Trump can help build the infrastructure of normalization, which will make reaching an eventual regional agreement easier and more beneficial to all parties.