The Biden Administration’s push for a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia presents a significant opportunity for the advancement of US interests in the Middle East, especially in terms of addressing the deepening Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, yielding to Saudi Arabia’s demands for more advanced arms, US security commitments and a nuclear program with substandard nonproliferation safeguards — while deprioritizing Palestinian concerns, democracy and human rights — would undermine critical US interests and contribute to regional instability.

Advancing US Interests in Israeli-Saudi Arabia Normalization Efforts

Saudi Arabia is by far the biggest potential prize in Israeli normalization efforts. The de facto leader of Sunni Gulf states, Saudi Arabia wields tremendous influence across the region. The Saudi government’s views impact how many Arab- and Muslim-majority countries deal with Israel and its conflict with the Palestinians, particularly as the architect and guardian of the Arab Peace Initiative.

Saudi Arabia has repeatedly made clear that steps toward Palestinian statehood are a prerequisite to establishment of full relations with Israel. Other countries in the region and beyond have given similar indications that normalization with Israel may be too heavy a lift in the absence of real progress in addressing Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians, including the occupation of Palestinian territory and its inherent injustices. Morocco’s recent cancellation of a Negev Forum summit in response to Israel’s announcement that it was advancing thousands of new settlement units in the occupied West Bank shows how the deepening conflict can hinder normalization efforts.

As the J Street Policy Center set out in our December 2022 report “Israeli-Arab Normalization and Advancing Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution,” this seeming challenge to further normalization agreements actually presents an opportunity to advance US, Israeli and Palestinian interests in easing the conflict and creating momentum toward a political horizon for its peaceful end. Chief among the steps the United States and Saudi Arabia could take to maximize normalization’s potential for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front would be securing a binding, written commitment from Israel not to make further moves toward annexation of West Bank territory. This should be defined comprehensively to bar, at a minimum, not only the de jure annexation of territory, but also the creation of new settlements through outpost “legalization,” expanding the footprints of existing settlements, mass demolitions and forced removals of Palestinian communities, and evictions of Palestinian families from their homes in East Jerusalem.

The United States and Saudi Arabia can also work together to secure terms that make key advances toward viable Palestinian statehood, like fostering Palestinian energy independence, allowing building permits and master plans for Palestinian construction in Area C, and updating and recommitting to the Arab Peace Initiative to provide a route to a negotiated end of the conflict.
The United States Must Not Subordinate Its Interests to Normalization at Any Price

Advocates aligned with the Trump Administration’s vision of normalization viewed the Abraham Accords as both an end-run around the Palestinians and as the framework for a regional military alliance against nuclear and other threats posed by Iran (which the J Street Policy Center has argued are better countered via diplomacy). Those advocating this vision are pushing the United States to take steps that could harm US interests such as capitulating to Saudi demands for massive advanced arms sales, significant new US security commitments and even the facilitation of a Saudi nuclear enrichment program not subject to key nonproliferation safeguards. While enhanced coordination in certain areas like missile detection and maritime security can be beneficial in enhancing stability and protecting US interests, fulfilling Saudi Arabia’s military wish list could draw the United States even deeper into the ever-changing regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Ironically, caution in tying ourselves militarily to Saudi Arabia has proven especially warranted following its re-normalization agreement with Iran, which has shown Riyadh’s own strategic positioning to be much more flexible than those arguing for formal US-Saudi military commitments had realized. Predictably, their reaction to the Saudi-Iran accord finalized under China’s auspices has been to redouble their prescription for the United States to fulfill Riyadh’s demands for arms and NATO-esque security guarantees. Referencing the Saudi-Iran deal and other developments in the context of arguing for a new “grand strategy” involving record new military spending to counter Russia and China, arch-neoconservative John Bolton wrote, “We must address the unease our Middle East friends feel about American resolve and, consistent with longstanding U.S. policy, exclude Moscow from regional influence, along with Beijing.”

In addition to being diametrically opposed to American voters’ reticence to send their tax dollars and loved ones in uniform into another Middle East quagmire, this militarist approach runs counter to the vision put forward by Jake Sullivan and Daniel Benaim — now National Security Advisor and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arabian Peninsula Affairs, respectively — eight months before the Biden Administration took office. Sullivan and Benaim envisioned regionally-focused diplomacy that “creates space to address regional challenges over time... that will ultimately allow for sustained reductions in its military presence, while safeguarding important interests in a region that still matters for the United States for years to come.” The regional reshuffling reflected in the Saudi-Iran deal and other recent dialogue between Iran and Gulf countries, along with the Abraham Accords, presents a perfect opportunity to explore such diplomacy, rather than a military build-up.

As it seeks to facilitate Israeli-Arab normalization and other regional diplomacy, the United States must not let up on — and in fact should intensify — pressing its concerns with both Saudi Arabia and Israel on democracy and human rights. This is especially necessary and appropriate in the context of a Saudi autocracy that holds itself out as seeking a more open society, but which continues grave human rights abuses, including avoiding meaningful accountability for the murder of US-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi. It is true as well regarding Israel, where a far right government not only continues to violate human rights in Palestinian territory, but is now attempting to bring some of the occupation’s illiberal features — like detention without charge — home to Israel.