



Breaking Free of the 'One-State Reality' in Israel-Palestine: Exploring Confederation Models

I. INTRODUCTION

During the week of the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords, the J Street Policy Center held a symposium focusing on the topic of confederation models for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The framing of the symposium was the question of whether two-state models that incorporate confederal elements could provide a means of breaking free of the entrenched ‘one-state reality’, characterized by overarching Israeli control over all of the inhabitants and land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Facing deepening occupation under the far-right government of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and suffering from a lack of competent Palestinian political leadership, Palestinians and Israelis lacked a political horizon for change. The crisis of democracy in Israel appeared to have created a moment of opportunity by revealing the direct threat that occupation poses to Israeli democracy¹ and potentially leading Israelis to a reckoning with the status quo. It was in this context that the symposium on confederation attempted to highlight an alternative, shared political vision.

Since the cataclysm of October 7, with the horrific atrocities committed by Hamas and other Gaza-based terrorist groups against Israelis and Israel’s ensuing military campaign against Hamas in Gaza, Israelis and Palestinians have entered a profound crisis with devastating casualties. It is difficult to see an end to this conflict, and there is a serious risk of a further regional escalation. Ultimately, there is no military solution to the conflict between the two peoples. Only a political solution that grants freedom, security, and self-determination to both Israelis and Palestinians can put an end to the cycle of violence.

At the heart of confederation models is the hope and imagination that a peaceful solution can be found by working together and recognizing the rights, identities, and histories of both sides. It is the values of cooperation and equal partnership that underlie these models and attempt to offer creative solutions to an otherwise intractable conflict. In the post-October 7 reality, the prospects for realizing cooperation and equal partnership must now overcome immense psychological barriers of renewed and heightened distrust, trauma, and fear. Yet, it is apparent that envisioning and pursuing a path to a different future is more urgent than ever. With these challenges and hope in mind, J Street reflects on the ideas shared by experts and offers policy recommendations for the next steps forward.

The J Street Policy Center symposium on confederation featured a panel with three speakers, two of whom – Hiba Hussein of the Holy Land Confederation (HLC) and May Pundak of A Land for All (ALFA) – are leaders in formulating and building support for a two-state solution in which Israel and Palestine would be joined together in a broader confederal framework. The third speaker, Gadi Baltiansky of the Geneva Initiative, brought a more conventional two-state perspective to the panel and indicated areas of agreement and disagreement between the traditional model and confederation approaches.

¹ On the connection between the occupation and the Netanyahu government’s assault on Israeli democracy, see Debra Shushan, “Shushan Street: Allyship in Israel’s Democratic Window of Opportunity,” J Street Policy Center, May 4, 2023, <https://jstreet.org/shushan-street-allyship-in-israels-democratic-window-of-opportunity>.

II. SUMMARY OF SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION



Symposium attendees listen to Hiba Hussein

Areas of consensus and disagreement among our experts emerged during the course of the symposium. This section explores areas of common ground among our participants and points on which significant disagreements were apparent. It should be noted that many of the topics discussed are now being revisited and reframed by experts following the events of October 7 and in the context of the Israel-Hamas war.

Main Areas of Consensus

■ **Need for a Paradigm Shift from Separation to Cooperation:**

Former attempts at negotiations to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have relied on the idea of separation between the two populations. Common metaphors used included “couples getting divorced” and “separating squabbling children,” which in the Israeli-Palestinian context translated roughly into: “Split the land, place an international border and a wall, or both, between them. Jerusalem could be sliced down the middle.”² There was broad agreement among participants at the symposium that rather than facilitating a peaceful resolution, the paradigm of separation had encouraged zero-sum thinking; produced fear, distance, and inequality; and exacerbated demonization of the other, on both sides. Beyond that, it was simply unworkable given the reality that both Israelis and Palestinians possess a deep connection to the entire land.

Participants generally agreed that the shift from separation to cooperation that underlies confederation models is necessary and important. Israelis and Palestinians face issues that they will need to address together, related to their intertwined economies and mutual challenges from climate change and water scarcity, health and pandemics, security,

² Dahlia Scheindlin, “Not Two States, Not One State: A New Way Out of Disaster for Israelis and Palestinians,” Haaretz, November 30, 2023, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-11-30/ty-article/.premium/not-two-states-not-one-state-a-new-way-out-of-disaster-for-israelis-and-palestinians/0000018c-1fc0-d21c-abae-7ffc7f960000>.

and more. Shared institutions, mutually agreed to by the two states, could enable the two societies to jointly address these challenges. Furthermore, shifting to a mindset of cooperation could open new avenues for solving previously intractable final-status issues.

The experiences of October 7 and the war in Gaza produced far reaching implications, including reinforcing the already deeply traumatized Israeli and Palestinian populations, playing into pre-existing narratives of victimization, and exacerbating the formidable barriers to cooperation between the two peoples. For many, this is likely to reinforce the conviction that the traditional separation approach to the pursuit of two states is necessary, and the collaborative confederation model is impossible. The task of pushing forward a paradigm shift from separation to cooperation certainly faces additional challenges.

■ **Need for National Reconciliation:**

Participants agreed that national reconciliation between the two peoples is crucial to the success of confederation and urged Israelis and Palestinians to work toward it immediately, rather than waiting for a conflict-ending agreement to begin the process. The Holy Land Confederation suggests the creation of a “Historical Memory Commission” to review and document key events of the conflict, along with other initiatives and commemorations. The authors also encourage public government apologies, programs for victims, joint history taught in schools, and people-to-people projects.³ Some participants from A Land For All posited that demographic, economic, and emotional connections to the shared homeland could be the most effective tool for reconciliation. Participants referred positively to the work of the Alliance for Middle East Peace and its member organizations, which focus on grassroots, civil society, and people-to-people programs to build trust between these two communities, especially among youth.⁴

■ **Importance of Preparing for a Window of Opportunity:**

Our symposium participants shared a sense of urgency, agreeing that Israelis and Palestinians – with help from outside partners – should immediately work to establish parameters for an agreement and build support for it. While there was common agreement that the moment was not ripe for negotiations, there was nonetheless a shared belief among our participants (whether avowed supporters of confederation or not) that it is important to be ready for the moment that a window of opportunity could open. While Israeli and Palestinian leadership remain far from the negotiating table, models need to be ready for when pragmatic leaders are in power and peace advocates should be united around a blueprint for a solution to the conflict. Many speakers noted a desperate need for political vision, hope, and a roadmap to a sustainable permanent solution.

³ Yossi Beilin and Hiba Hussein, “The Holy Land Confederation as a Facilitator for the Two-State Solution,” 2022, 35-36, <https://www.monmouth.edu/news/documents/the-holy-land-confederation-as-a-facilitator-for-the-two-state-solution-english.pdf/>.

⁴ Alliance for Middle East Peace, “Our Work,” <https://www.allmep.org/our-work/>.

■ Incompatibility of Occupation and Democracy:

At the time of the symposium, the democratic crisis in Israel stemming from the Netanyahu government's attempted judicial overhaul was front and center. It had become increasingly clear to the participating experts that those pushing to deepen the occupation and subvert Israeli democracy were one and the same, and they generally agreed that Israel could not preserve democracy while continuing an occupation that denies millions of Palestinians the right to self-determination. Some participants also argued that a peaceful solution resulting in the partition of two states is key to maintaining Israel's Jewish and democratic character. In addition, many felt that increasing recognition of this fact among Israelis was creating an opportunity to build support for ending the status quo. While the connection between occupation and the attempted judicial overhaul was not front of mind for the pro-democracy camp, and was even pushed aside in many cases, many of our experts felt that the protest movement provided an opportunity to bring the pursuit of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict back to the public agenda.



Thousands protesting the Israeli government, February 2023

Key Areas of Disagreement

■ Path to a Two-State Solution or a Means of Movement-Building:

A significant portion of the discussion by participants focused on comparing and contrasting the two confederation models proposed by the panelists. Faced with clear impediments to a two-state solution, the drafters of the Holy Land Confederation model explained their plan as a means of solving previously intractable, final-status policy issues. Their overriding goal is to reach a two-state solution, and confederation is a means to that end. The most prominent stumbling block that HLC attempts to address are the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the difficulty of removing them. (For more on how it proposes to do that, see below.)

A Land For All takes a more grassroots approach, building a movement of Israelis and Palestinians to co-create a plan for peace. The organization focuses on reframing the thinking toward shared love for a mutual homeland and a commitment to equality. This model emphasizes the paradigm shift from zero-sum separation to cooperation. Many participants felt inspired by ALFA's emphasis on building a shared movement among Israelis and Palestinians as a means of breaking the current impasse and creating a new, cooperative reality. While A Land for All describes itself as seeking two states within one

shared homeland, critics charge that the model is either overly idealistic, or going down a road to a single binational state.

■ **Sequencing:**

Confederation supporters differ in their prescriptions regarding when confederation between Israel and Palestine should occur. Some of our participants favored the establishment of a confederation after a waiting period following the establishment of the State of Palestine, while others argued that a confederation should be in place from the start of a two-state agreement. Supporters of a “classic” two-state solution encouraged the creation of a Palestinian state first, and then discussions on what the relationship between the states would look like.

Among supporters of confederation, proponents of the Holy Land Confederation would prescribe a set implementation period, such as 36 months, in order to disengage from the occupation, establish the Palestinian state’s infrastructure, and deal with public responses. At the end of that period, a confederation would be established. By contrast, A Land for All supporters encouraged confederation up front, arguing that it would provide new tools for negotiation and solutions instead of the old paradigm of separation, while still noting that the confederation itself could evolve and deepen gradually.

■ **Settlements:**

Israeli settlements are a seminal obstacle to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the question of how settlements should be handled in a peace agreement was a significant topic of debate during the symposium. Settlements and outposts, which are illegal under international law⁵, have proliferated and fragmented the occupied West Bank. The number of Israeli settlers in Area C of the West Bank is approaching 500,000, with over 200,000 more in East Jerusalem.⁶


Supporters of confederation differ on the question of how to deal with settlements, and those disagreements came through during our discussion. Proponents of the Holy Land Confederation hew closer to the separation paradigm. Like the Geneva Initiative⁷ – a model for a two-state solution in which Israel and Palestine would exchange land, enabling Israel to annex “settlement blocs” – HLC also uses land swaps and Israeli annexation of the “blocs” to determine borders. Whereas the Geneva Initiative would require that Israel evacuate its citizens from the settlements and outposts outside the “blocs,” in areas that become part of the new Palestinian state, the HLC plan would allow these Israeli settlers to choose to remain, as long as they are willing to become law-abiding residents of Palestine. It would allow an equal number of citizens of the Palestinian state to become law-abiding residents of Israel.

⁵ ICRC, International Humanitarian Law Databases, “Article 49 - Deportations, Transfers, Evacuations,” <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49>.

⁶ Peace Now, “Israeli Settlements Map 2023,” <https://peacenow.org.il/en/%D9%8Dsettlements-map-2023>.

⁷ “The Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement,” https://geneva-accord.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/The-Geneva-Accord_-Full-Text.pdf.

Some confederation supporters took issue with HLC's pegging the number of Palestinians who could take up residence in Israel to the number of Israeli settlers remaining in Palestine. The proposal offered by A Land for All takes a more open, liberal approach. In its vision, freedom of movement across borders would allow citizens of both states to live as law-abiding residents where they choose. This would allow for less emphasis on the exact placement of the border, the ability for Palestinian refugees to return to their places of origin as citizens of Palestine and residents of Israel, and the option for Israeli settlers to remain in the West Bank as residents of Palestine and citizens of Israel.



Jewish settlement in the West Bank

Some participants were critical of the approaches to settlements adopted by confederation models, arguing that these models legitimize settlements. They maintain that Israeli settlers living outside settlement “blocs” must be relocated. A proponent of the ALFA approach responded that the notion of settlement blocs was itself problematic, enabling the tremendous growth in the number of settlers – within the so-called blocs – since the adoption of the Oslo Accords. Disagreements regarding the best approach to the difficult issue of settlements notwithstanding, participants were united in their determination to ensure that a relatively small minority of extremist settlers would not be able to act as spoilers derailing a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

■ Jordan:

While most confederation models are limited to Israel and Palestine, some experts have suggested that a confederation should include Jordan. One participant argued that Jordan would have incentive to participate due to its role as the custodian of holy sites in Jerusalem, its demographic composition with a large Palestinian population, and shared national security concerns over mutual borders.⁸

To the contrary, however, another participant claimed that the Jordanian public would approach the idea of a tripartite confederation with great concern – as it would the prospect of any linkages of Jordan to a Palestinian state under any framework. Such a partnership would “risk exposing Jordanian demography to an experimental paradigm that is unpredictable.”⁹ Without question, Jordan has a deeply vested interest in a

⁸ Alon Ben-Meir, “The Case for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Confederation: Why Now and How?” *World Affairs* 185, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 30-35. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00438200211066350>.

⁹ Farah Bdour, “How Do Confederal Horizons Impact Final Status Issues and Related Jordan’s Strategic Calculus?,” July 17, 2023.

peaceful resolution to the conflict and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Given that Jordan's national interests will be impacted by the choices Israelis and Palestinians make in resolving their final-status issues, its leaders will want to be "in the negotiation room, and often, at the negotiation table" if and when a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian confederation is established. While a tripartite confederation may lack appeal for Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdom could take a greater interest in broader regional integration.

■ **Diaspora Communities:**

Participants disagreed regarding whether Jewish and Palestinian diaspora communities might play a positive role and whether it is worthwhile for Israelis and Palestinians working on confederation to seek their support. Some participants were concerned that diaspora communities would dismiss confederation as a highly ideological and left-wing idea, and some charged that diaspora communities are out of touch with the developing ideology on the ground. Others insisted that diaspora communities feel attachment to the entire land, and this could be used to encourage support for confederation models. Certainly, the months since October 7 have underscored the intense engagement of diaspora communities, both Jewish and Palestinian, with the events unfolding in Israel-Palestine and their commitment to impacting them.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The horrific Hamas attack on October 7 and the devastating Israel-Hamas war that has ensued has made clearer than ever the desperate need for a long-term political solution to put an end to the pernicious cycle of violence that has plagued Israelis and Palestinians. J Street agrees with President Biden, who stated: "There's no going back to the status quo as it stood on October 6. That means ensuring that Hamas can no longer terrorize Israel and use Palestinians civilians as human shields. It also means that when this crisis is over, there has to be a vision of what comes next, and in our view it has to be a two-state solution."¹⁰ The following are our recommendations for Israeli and Palestinian activists and policy experts who are working toward a political solution and favor a confederal two-state approach, as well as steps the Biden Administration should take.

For Israeli and Palestinian activists and policy experts seeking a confederal two-state solution, we recommend:

1. Continue Movement Building and Grassroots Efforts in Israel-Palestine:

This is an important moment for grassroots confederation efforts to work on building their movements. Without a doubt, it will be challenging to amass support in both publics. The Israeli public may move further to the right following the October 7 attack¹¹ and

¹⁰ Jacob Magid, "Biden: There's No Going Back to Prewar Status Quo, There Must Be Vision of 2 States," The Times of Israel, October 26, 2023, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/biden-theres-no-going-back-to-pre-war-status-quo-there-must-be-vision-of-2-states/>.

polling indicates majority support for the Hamas assault among Palestinians in Gaza and even higher support and satisfaction with Hamas in the West Bank,¹² which is a notable contrast to Palestinians' lack of trust in Hamas before October 7.¹³ Israel's conduct in its war against Hamas is likely to further harden Palestinian public opinion against Israel, even while some Palestinians in Gaza may harbor anger toward Hamas for its actions. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has warned that Israel risks a "strategic defeat" if it drives Palestinian civilians in Gaza "into the arms of the enemy"¹⁴ and experts warn that the war could propel more Palestinians to militancy than the number of terrorists it can hope to eliminate.¹⁵ At the same time, there is hope: the aftermath of conflict can lead to reassessment and breakthroughs for peace – the signing of the Camp David Accords in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the gradual unification of Europe following World War II being two prominent examples.

Despite formidable challenges, supporters of confederation are determined to continue and grow their grassroots efforts. On October 10, A Land for All held the first meeting of its unified Board of Directors composed of both Israelis and Palestinians, citing a determination to "practice what we preach," as the organization works to build its movement.¹⁶ This is key to displaying to fellow Israelis and Palestinians, as well as the international community, that there is still a vital constituency for peace, even at the most challenging time. Their efforts can help to shape and build support for initiatives to reach a political solution to the conflict and can help to convince international actors to invest politically and economically in postwar reconstruction and Israeli-Palestinian peace.

2. Build International Support:

In addition to grassroots work among Israelis and Palestinians, groups advancing confederation should work to cultivate international support for their efforts. This is crucial because any push for a postwar political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have to be heavily supported by the US, Europe, the Arab world, and the broader international community. Israeli and Palestinian supporters of confederation should present their visions for the "day after" to key international stakeholders – in particular, the US government. They should seek to place their work on the confederation approach and its continued applicability after October 7 in influential publications and build on

¹¹ Dahlia Scheindlin, "Why Israel Won't Change: The War in Gaza Will Likely Reinforce the Country's Rightward Tilt," *Foreign Affairs*, November 29, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/why-israel-wont-change>.

¹² Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (90)," December 13, 2023, <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/961>; Dahlia Scheindlin, "Three-Quarters of Palestinians Support Hamas' Attack on October 7, Says New Poll. Why?" *Haaretz*, November 22, 2023, <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2023-11-22/ty-article/.premium/three-quarters-of-palestinians-support-hamas-attack-on-october-7-says-new-poll-why/0000018b-f841-d473-affb-f9e9eeef0000>.

¹³ Amaney A. Jamal and Michael Robbins, "What Palestinians Really Think of Hamas: Before the War, Gaza's Leaders Were Deeply Unpopular – but an Israeli Crackdown Could Change That," *Foreign Affairs*, October 25, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/what-palestinians-really-think-hamas>.

¹⁴ Paul McLeary, "Israel Needs to Protect Civilians or Risk 'Strategic Failure' in Gaza," *Politico*, December 2, 2023, <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/02/israel-civilians-gaza-00129762>.

¹⁵ Robert A. Pape, "Israel's Failed Bombing Campaign in Gaza: Collective Punishment Won't Defeat Hamas," *Foreign Affairs*, December 6, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israels-failed-bombing-campaign-gaza>.

¹⁶ May Pundak, "A Conversation on a Shared Political Vision for Palestine-Israel, A Land for All, Video," December 6, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMLvblLajwl>.

the trend of foreign policy influencers favorably mentioning confederation in their own articles addressing the “day after.”¹⁷ Approaches to diaspora communities, particularly in the US, may be helpful given their capacity to advocate with the American government.

To the Biden Administration and US lawmakers, we recommend:

1. Consider Lessons from Confederal Approaches:

The biggest draw of confederation is that it offers creative new proposals for previously intractable final status issues. Some of the key lessons from confederal approaches include: an appreciation of the feeling of connection by Israelis and Palestinians to the entire land, which should be recognized in any solution to the conflict; the need for a defined border between Israel and Palestine, but also the importance of freedom of movement, particularly in areas like Jerusalem and holy sites; and the need for cooperative frameworks between Israel and a future Palestinian state to address shared challenges, including security, economy and trade, managing natural resources, health and pandemics, and addressing climate change. As the Biden Administration develops and pushes forward a vision for a political solution, it should promote steps that keep pathways to cooperation and equality open, even if it does not explicitly embrace confederation.

2. Outline a Vision for a Political Solution and Work with Partners on Transitional Steps Toward Palestinian Statehood:

Like others who want to maximize the likelihood that the current crisis will be followed by a durable political solution for Israelis and Palestinians, supporters of confederation are focused on outlining transitional steps. Some include a major role for President Biden and the US government,¹⁸ and we agree that US involvement will be critical, and that President Biden should add detail to his vision for the “day after” the defeat of Hamas and the end of hostilities in Gaza that includes the explicit goal of establishing a Palestinian state within a limited timeframe. Confederation supporters also recognize the need for a transitional authority,¹⁹ or international trusteeship,²⁰ to provide security in Gaza in the interim postwar period. We agree that working with partners – willing Arab states, in particular – to establish such an authority is an urgent task. Additional

¹⁷ Some examples include: Matthew Duss and Nancy Okail, “Extend the Cease-Fire in Gaza – but Don’t Stop There: Regional Diplomacy and an Overhaul of US Policy Could Produce Lasting Peace,” Foreign Affairs, November 27, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/israel-hamas-ceasefire-united-states-peace-deal-gaza> and David N. Myers, “Gaza’s Devastation and Palestine’s Future Will Require a New Marshall Plan,” Los Angeles Times, November 21, 2023, <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2023-11-21/gaza-destruction-palestine-future-new-marshall-plan>.

¹⁸ Bernard Avishai and Ezzediune Fishere, “The Answer Lies with Biden,” The New York Times, December 12, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/12/opinion/gaza-israel-palestinians-plans.html>.

¹⁹ Ibid, and Prince, James, Hiba Hussein, and Marshall Berger, “Lessons for Israel and Palestine from Cambodia’s Transition to Democracy,” The Hill, November 1, 2023. <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4285982-lessons-for-israel-and-palestine-from-cambodias-transition-to-democracy/>.

²⁰ Limor Yehuda, Omar M. Dajani, and John McGarry, “Establish an International Trusteeship,” The New York Times, December 12, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/12/opinion/gaza-israel-palestinians-plans.html>.

key steps recommended by proponents of confederation include establishing a Marshall Plan for Palestine²¹ (which can also include communities in Israel ravaged in Hamas' attack) and reintegrating Gaza and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem).²²

Notably, the long-term success of any transition plan to the conflict resolution stage likely depends on the establishment of a new Israeli government committed to a political resolution. Meanwhile, the US government will need the political will to press the Netanyahu government to facilitate the establishment of a

transitional authority. Ultimately, we urge the Biden Administration to work with the transitional authority to facilitate the takeover of the Palestinian territory by a revitalized Palestinian Authority within a limited period. The PA's legitimacy would be bolstered at first by welcoming new leaders from Palestinian civil society and later through elections. For our full recommendations, please see our J Street Policy Center issue brief: "Achieving Israeli-Palestinian Peace in the Wake of the Israel-Hamas War."²³



President Joe Biden at the 2014 J Street National Conference

IV. CONCLUSION

At our symposium, our participants spoke of the urgency of the moment, and their calls to action in order to bring about a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict feel even more critical now than they did prior to October 7. The crisis has opened a short window of opportunity where key actors in the international community realize the urgency of achieving a sustainable peace. While there are many challenges to overcome within this window, we believe the Biden Administration and other key international players, as well as activists for peace and reconciliation on the ground in Israel-Palestine, must seize it.

A central question is whether efforts for advancing a political solution should prioritize the traditional paradigm of separation or the vision of cooperation put forth by supporters of confederation. Prior to October 7, proponents of confederation had not yet gained significant traction among decision-makers and large swaths of the Israeli and Palestinian publics. Now, in a post-October 7 reality, with the renewed trauma experienced by both Israelis and Palestinians – as well as the pre-existing challenges of the current Israeli leadership's approach to the conflict and the lack of Palestinian leadership – there are even greater obstacles

²¹ A Land for All, "Building a Bridge to Partnership: A Land for All, Two States, One Homeland," November 2023.

²² Ibid.

²³ J Street Policy Center, "Achieving Israeli-Palestinian Peace in the Wake of the Israel-Hamas War," Issue Brief No. 16, November 30, 2023, <https://jstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/IB-Achieving-Israeli-Palestinian-Peace-in-the-Wake-of-the-Israel-Hamas-War.pdf>.

to promoting an approach based on cooperation between the two peoples. The natural tendency in a post-war environment is to assume that separation is the best way forward. Indeed, many supporters of a two-state solution are eager to achieve separation between Israelis and Palestinians to prevent future paroxysms of violence and achieve security. A question remains whether or not complete separation is the most effective approach in the pursuit of safety and the flourishing of both populations. Israeli political scientist Dahlia Scheindlin thinks not, noting that Gaza is the ultimate example of the consequences of total segregation, with imposed isolation producing misery for its civilian population and, ultimately, Israel's greatest security threat.²⁴

While supporters of confederation will likely face heightened skepticism of their ideas after October 7, it is important that they be part of the critical policy discussions happening now, and offer their specific prescriptions. Policymakers should aim to keep avenues open for confederal approaches, rather than making choices that would preclude such possibility in the future. At the J Street Policy Center, we are pleased to be able to foster engagement with these ideas at such a pivotal time.

²⁴ Scheindlin, "Not Two States, Not One State."

V. COMPENDIUM OF ARTICLES

- A Land for All, “Building a Bridge to Partnership: A Land for All, Two States, One Homeland,” November 2023.
- A Land for All, “From Conflict to Reconciliation: A New Vision for Palestinian-Israeli Peace,” 2021. <https://www.alandforall.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/booklet-english.pdf>.
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