

Nine Months In: Assessing the Status of the Gaza Ceasefire

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This report updates J Street's April 16, 2026 tracker, [Six Months In: Assessing the Status of the Gaza Ceasefire](#), and focuses on the April 15-July 15 timeframe. The bottom line is that little progress has occurred regarding implementation of the second phase of President Trump's [20-Point Plan](#) for Gaza during the past three months, and Palestinians living in the Strip continue to face a humanitarian catastrophe.

The Board of Peace (BoP), established by President Trump and endorsed in [United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803](#), has failed to convince Hamas and Israel to take the steps outlined in the plan, as both parties seemingly prefer the status quo over offering meaningful concessions. The Trump administration, meanwhile, has been distracted by the ongoing conflict with Iran and its broader implications for stability in the region.

The dire humanitarian circumstances confronting Gaza's population, as documented by the [United Nations](#) and [other humanitarian actors](#), demand immediate attention. At the same time, concerted action is required by all relevant parties to establish a precise timeline for disarming Hamas, transitioning governance responsibilities in Gaza to the National Committee for the Advancement of Gaza (NCAG), deploying an International Stabilization Force (ISF) and civilian police, securing an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and for the ultimate political reunification of Gaza and the West Bank as part of an independent Palestinian state.

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I. Ending the Fighting and Releasing the Hostages

What the Plan Says

"3. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed-upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal."

“4. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.”

While the intensity of military operations has diminished since the ceasefire, the United Nations has [verified](#) that Israeli attacks have killed 629 people – including 269 women and children – between October 10, 2025 and April 2026. According to figures [compiled](#) by Gaza’s Ministry of Health, an additional 300 Palestinians have been killed since mid-April. Israel claims that its actions, which include aerial strikes, target Hamas militants involved in planning and carrying out the attacks on October 7, 2023. However, the attacks have also resulted in the deaths of numerous family members and civilian bystanders. During the mid-April to mid-July period, no Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza.

II. Unimpeded Surge of Humanitarian Aid

What the Plan Says

“7. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.”

“8. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party.”

- **Overall situation:** In his June 16 [report](#) to the UN Security Council, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator stated that Palestinians in Gaza today “remain deprived of the basics that you would all demand for your own families: safety, shelter, clean water, healthcare, [and] education.”
- **Restricted access of goods:** According to UN 2720 mechanism [data](#), the number of pallets offloaded by UN agencies and NGO partners at the Kerem Shalom crossing decreased in May and June from what was recorded in April. More generally, cumbersome approvals and customs procedures, combined with restrictions on so-called ‘dual-use’ items, continue to limit the entry of critical humanitarian supplies and preclude meaningful economic recovery. Israel, meanwhile, [claims](#) that since the ceasefire went into effect, “humanitarian assistance entered Gaza in volumes that substantially exceeded internationally claimed humanitarian requirements, leading to vastly improved conditions.”

- **Improved food security:** Since the ceasefire, the share of households reporting going to bed hungry [dropped](#) from 92 percent to 36 percent. However, diversion of humanitarian assistance remains a concern, with the United Nations publicly [accusing](#) Hamas security forces of interfering with the delivery of food aid at a food distribution site on July 11 and describing the incident as not an isolated event. Meanwhile, efforts to restore agricultural production have been [limited](#) as 80 percent of greenhouse infrastructure remains damaged or out of production, while most agricultural land in Gaza remains inaccessible.
- **Health conditions:** In the last two weeks of June, more than [9,300 cases](#) of chickenpox were reported across 130 health facilities in Gaza. [As of July 8](#), only 3 hospitals, 18 primary health care facilities, and 13 medical points are fully functional across all of Gaza. Medical evacuations through Rafah are occurring at a frustratingly slow pace, with [only 68 patients](#) allowed to leave during the week of July 1-7.
- **Shelter:** [70 percent](#) of the population remains in need of proper shelter, and many of the existing shelters face rat infestations due to unsanitary conditions.
- **UNRWA:** Approximately [11,000 UNRWA staff](#) continue to provide health, education, and other social services in Gaza, despite severe restrictions that Israel has placed on the operations of the organization since March 2026. In a June 30 social media [post](#), the Board of Peace stated that “UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza. We are turning the page on the complex of perpetual aid dependency & conflict. The people of Gaza deserve better.” The BoP statement received [strong blowback](#) from the U.N., international donors, and Palestinian leadership, which view UNRWA’s role, particularly in Gaza, as irreplaceable.
- **International NGOs:** On May 20, Israel’s High Court [rejected](#) a petition filed by international aid organizations operating in Gaza (and the West Bank) to nullify an Israeli law requiring the submission of employee lists to the government. While many of the organizations continue to function in the Palestinian territories, they no longer have access to Israeli government officials to arrange visas for staff to enter Israel, or to cross into Gaza, and to transfer humanitarian goods into Gaza.

III. Establishing a Governance and Security Alternative to Hamas

What the Plan Says

“9. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of

qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the ‘Board of Peace.’”

Nikolai Mladenov, the Board of Peace’s High Representative for Gaza, [updated](#) the Security Council on May 21 and a European Union-convened [meeting](#) of donors on July 13 regarding the challenges the Board continues to face. In his reports, Mladenov has highlighted the following key points:

- The Board of Peace was established as a temporary body to oversee “governance, reconstruction and redevelopment **until a reformed Palestinian Authority can resume its responsibilities in Gaza.**”
- **“ Hamas and the other factions will have no role in the governance of Gaza — not directly, not indirectly, not in any form.”**
- **“Decommissioning of weapons will be gradual, sequenced and time-bound,** against an agreed timetable. It will be monitored and supported. It will be Palestinian-led, with weapons transferred to the NCAG.”
- “If transition and decommissioning are delayed or refused, the Board of Peace will discuss meaningful and practical modalities to advance civilian stabilization, humanitarian relief and recovery, based on the architecture the parties have agreed to when the Comprehensive plan was developed, approved by the Arab and Islamic states and endorsed by the UN Security Council.”
- “The people of Gaza cannot wait and should not wait, but we should also not be deluded by false choices of pragmatic defeatism. Returning to a business-as-usual approach in Gaza, of piecemeal recovery efforts, where recovery is hindered by access restrictions, undermined by diversion, and carried out under the threat of the gun will only entrench the misery of the current status quo. If we want recovery across Gaza to become reconstruction at scale, Hamas must lay down its weapons and Israeli forces must withdraw. There is no other scenario.”

NCAG, meanwhile, has yet to enter Gaza; its members are working from Cairo, pending Hamas disarmament and Israeli approval. In an effort to revive momentum and to convince international donors to support NCAG’s efforts, BoP and NCAG officials, together with external advisers, [met](#) in Cyprus June 30-July 1; however, no timeline for next steps was announced at the conclusion of the meeting.

On July 6, Hamas [announced](#) that it was handing over civilian governance authority in Gaza to NCAG, without committing to a firm timeline to disarm. In response, NCAG’s chair [commented](#) on social media that the committee was “fully prepared to assume its national responsibilities as soon as the necessary resources and capabilities are available,” while the BoP [noted](#) that its assessment would be guided by “actions, not words” and that “the technocratic committee

must control all weapons in Gaza, as laid out in the ceasefire agreement.” For its part, Israel [rejected](#) the move as an empty gesture absent Hamas disarmament.

On July 13, the European Union [convened](#) a meeting, which included high-level participation from the PA, NCAG, BoP, and international donors and which was designed to:

- Take stock of the PA’s economic situation and international financial support;
- Present the progress of the PA’s implementation of its Reform Agenda; and
- Launch a “Team Gaza Initiative” together with other European and international donors.

At the meeting, the EU [announced](#) nearly €900 million in funding commitments for early recovery and reconstruction projects in Gaza.

International Stabilization Force

“15. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces.”

The [status](#) of the International Stabilization Force remains uncertain. Indonesia, which was expected to provide 8,000 troops to the ISF, suspended its participation in the aftermath of the US-Israel-Iran conflict. On July 15, Morocco became the first country to sign a [legal agreement](#) governing its participation in the International Stabilization Force for Gaza, and moved a step closer to deploying security personnel and a military field hospital. Albania, Kazakhstan, and Kosovo are the other countries that have committed to provide troops to the ISF.

IV. Disarming Hamas

What the Plan Says

“13. Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration program all verified by the independent monitors.”

Disarming Hamas remains the pivot point for progress on three other key areas covered in this memo: the deployment of NCAG, Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and meaningful progress on reconstruction. Negotiations continue between the BoP and Hamas, with active mediation by

Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, but no agreement has yet been finalized. One seemingly intractable point is Hamas' [insistence](#) that any disarmament arrangement be part of a package that includes a commitment by all parties to recognize a Palestinian state, which Israel would be unlikely to accept, particularly before the October 27 elections in Israel.

V. Israeli Withdrawal

What the Plan Says

“16. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization ... Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure.”

Given the absence of an ISF deployment and the failure of Hamas to disarm, Israel contends that it is not obliged to withdraw the IDF from Gaza. Once the ISF does deploy, negotiations regarding the precise contours and timing of the IDF withdrawal are likely to be highly contentious. In the interim, Israel has entrenched [40 distinct](#) military outposts within Gaza, eight of which were constructed entirely from scratch after the ceasefire, and now controls approximately [70 percent](#) of Gaza, with Prime Minister Netanyahu claiming that the military's expanding footprint in Gaza is part of a step-by-step plan to surround Hamas from all sides.

The Plan's Alternative Option

“17. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.”

The plan states explicitly that the IDF is supposed to hand over territory to the ISF even if Hamas does not cooperate on disarming and handing over authority. The implementation of this provision, however, faces three [challenges](#):

- (1) The ISF and alternative Palestinian police force are still in the process of formation, so there is no force to whom territory can be handed over (see above).
- (2) Israel has insisted it will not withdraw from Gaza until Hamas is fully disarmed. This casts doubt on the option that Israel would hand over territory if Hamas continues to reject proposals.
- (3) The willingness of NCAG to operate in a restricted enclave and of Palestinians to move there remain open questions.

VI. Reconstruction

What the Plan Says

“2. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.”

As described in J Street’s six-month [tracker](#), progress with respect to reconstruction has been constrained by several factors, including the following:

- While NCAG has developed extensive plans for the reconstruction efforts, its members are not yet present on the ground, and its credibility among Palestinians is fading.
- Donors have been reluctant to pledge funding until they are confident that there will be no resumption of hostilities and that Phase II of the Trump plan will be implemented.
- Continued restrictions on the import of reconstruction materials prevent any meaningful reconstruction activities.

The situation with respect to these factors has not changed during the ensuing three months. Nonetheless, Hamas has been [working](#) with support from Gulf states and other actors, including Turkey, to rehabilitate areas under its control. These efforts have involved clearing debris, restoring infrastructure, roads, and public buildings, and attempting to rebuild residential neighborhoods where possible, subject to the restrictions described above.

On July 8, a BoP official [indicated](#) that planning is underway for “a pilot humanitarian zone for Gazans as a way to kickstart the US president’s stalled peace plan, regardless of whether a deal is reached with Hamas.” According to the official, “the plan would allow the NCAG to exercise its authority, and a newly recruited and trained police force to act as a law enforcement arm along with an International Stabilization Force (ISF) made up of multinational peacekeeping forces.” The vetting process for Palestinians allowed to work and live in the pilot zone is currently under discussion, although the opportunity to escape the current realities of Hamas-controlled Gaza may be attractive for many Gazans.

VII. Progress Toward Palestinian Statehood

What the Plan Says

“While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognise as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.”

Municipal elections took place on April 25 in the West Bank and in the Gaza municipality of Deir al-Balah. Despite challenging circumstances, the Central Election Commission was able to

[organize](#) a credible electoral exercise. However, the elections were contested mostly on local issues and their national significance was quite limited.

In June, President Abbas announced a plan to conduct elections for the Palestine National Council, which operates under the auspices of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Palestine Legislative Council, which is part of the Palestinian Authority, on November 1, and for PA President in early 2027. On July 9, Abbas [issued](#) a presidential decree setting November 28, 2026, as the date for the legislative elections. However, given the overwhelming political and logistical [challenges](#), many Palestinians remain skeptical that the elections will take place per the announced timetable.

The PA, meanwhile, continues to face diminishing credibility among Palestinians amidst a severe [financial crisis](#) caused by Israel's withholding of clearance revenues and the refusal of Israeli banks to clear the surplus of shekels in Palestinian banks; an inability to pay civil service employees (including teachers), and its seeming impotence in restraining settler violence directed at Palestinian civilians in the West Bank. The prospects for national elections changing this dynamic remain highly doubtful.