As J Street heads into the next four years of the Trump Administration, we will need to consider new ways to continue to stand up for our pro-Israel, pro-peace, pro-democracy values. This will not be an easy time. Many of the Trump Administration's domestic policy actions and overall agenda are in direct contradiction to J Street’s values. Some of the Administration’s broader foreign policy edicts, such as shuttering USAID and picking fights with key allies around the world, will also have deeply damaging effects for Israel and Palestine.
It is still unclear where the Administration will land on the question of annexing parts of the West Bank. Trump’s proposal for the US to take over Gaza and forcibly displace two million Palestinians is horrifying and anathema to all J Street stands for. At the same time, the Administration has also taken some positive steps. Specifically, Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff worked closely with Biden Administration negotiators to get a ceasefire and hostage deal and is continuing to work to ensure full implementation so that all of the hostages come home and the war ends. Trump has expressed a desire to get a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia and Israel, and as part of that may be willing to push significant concessions for the Palestinians.
In the context of this dichotomy and the unpredictable nature of the Administration’s policies, this memo outlines a number of J Street’s key policy priorities for at least the next year, but likely longer. Where the Administration’s policies run counter to our recommendations we will oppose them, but where we have overlapping interests we will support bipartisan cooperation. This memo will be followed in the months ahead by a series of papers that will go into greater detail on a number of the highest priority issues laid out below:
End the war in Gaza, bring the hostages home, invest in rebuilding Gaza, and build a viable governing and security alternative to Hamas instead of perpetuating the conflict.
The Trump Administration should use all available leverage to pressure Hamas to return all of the hostages and Israel to end the war in Gaza. J Street rejects any proposal to have Israel and the United States forcibly displace the people of Gaza and/or occupy the Strip. Instead, the United States must persuade, including through judicious pressure, the Israeli government to work together with the United States, Arab partners, the international community, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) on a serious and viable plan for post-conflict Gaza. Such a plan would involve a huge surge in humanitarian aid and major economic investments in reconstruction – both of which will be undermined unless the Trump Administration changes its approach to foreign assistance. It will also require the insertion of a transitionary international/Arab-led force in Gaza, training of Palestinian Authority Security Forces to ensure they can eventually take over security control of Gaza; and agreement on a transitionary governance structure that includes some PA role from the beginning and ultimately results in a full reintegration of Gaza and the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority. Such an approach is a years-long project and will be exceedingly difficult. However, it is the only way to replace Hamas. Failing to pursue this strategy could lead to a collapse of the ceasefire, which will prevent the release of the hostages.
Failing to pursue a viable alternative post-war governance path could lead to a resumption of Israeli operations against Hamas targets with no plan for replacing the governing structure – a recipe for perpetual war that will lead to indefinite misery for the two million people living in Gaza, not replace Hamas with any viable alternative, and come at a very high cost to Israel – both in terms of military and economic costs as well as international isolation. A third possibility where Israel and Hamas find a way to end the war and get the hostages out with no real agreement on “day after” for Gaza, is far preferable to restarting the war but will leave the situation in Gaza to fester with Hamas still in control, few prospects for reconstruction, and Israel less secure.
Pursue a “23 state solution,” which ends Israel’s conflict with its 22 Arab neighbors, while also creating a Palestinian state that would be Israel’s 23rd Arab neighbor.
Israel’s increasing integration into the Middle East, most recently through the Abraham Accords, presents significant opportunities to end decades of conflict and increase economic prosperity for millions across the region. Conversely, as we have seen with the war in Gaza, failure to address the Palestinian issue will hinder the warming of relations between Israel and its neighbors, and has already led to an erosion of some of the progress that was made under the Abraham Accords.
There are numerous pathways to get to both a two-state solution and a simultaneous comprehensive regional peace, but any step-by-step process must involve:
1) Agreements on major international investment in Gaza and Israeli facilitation of an effective “day-after” strategy;
2) Tangible, credible, irreversible steps on the ground that improve freedom for Palestinians and set the conditions for the establishment of a Palestinian state in exchange for additional steps towards economic and military cooperation between Israel its Arab neighbors;
3) A pace that persuades skeptical Palestinians that this time the process will be implemented.
All of this would culminate in full recognition by the Arab world of the State of Israel, and full recognition by Israel of a Palestinian state. Along the way, Arab leaders will need to pursue vigorous public diplomacy to convince the Israeli public that peace and security is possible. The United States should be willing to make major commitments of its own to both Israel and the Arab states as part of a step-by-step process and eventual agreement.
Take advantage of Iran’s diminished military capability to pursue nuclear and regional diplomacy from a position of strength.
Iran has experienced unprecedented setbacks, including the fall of its ally Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad; the dramatic weakening of Hezbollah both through the conflict with Israel that saw much of its leadership eliminated and the fall of Assad dramatically impacting its ability to rearm; Israeli and American cooperation to defeat Iranian ballistic missile attacks; and Israeli operations to degrade Iran’s air defenses. At the same time, this weakening in Iran’s regional position has caused it to double down on its nuclear program.
Military and economic pressure alone has historically failed to shift Iran’s calculus, while combining that pressure with clear-eyed diplomacy is what successfully achieved the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which dramatically rolled back its nuclear program. Given this history, now is the time for the US to test whether a meaningful diplomatic breakthrough with Iran is possible in order to roll back Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions, while continuing to leverage economic sanctions against Iran unless it makes necessary concessions. At the same time, pursuing a “23 state solution” and strengthening a unified front across the region will only apply more pressure on Iran, weakening its power and leverage in the region.