Is the U.S. about to ‘cheat’ on the Iran nuclear deal? Here’s how this could backfire, Washington Post

“[I]n designing monitoring for an arms control agreement, states face a trade-off between having enough transparency to observe compliance and needing sufficient safety from observation that could jeopardize their security. For example, visiting all Iranian military facilities could be very useful in verifying that the country was not conducting any nuclear work — but would also reveal military targets that could be exploited in the event of a conflict. If Iran decides that information sharing in a current nuclear agreement will leave the regime more vulnerable in the future, including beyond the nuclear context, Tehran will have few reasons to renegotiate the deal. Because of this trade-off, states have to make compromises to get an arms control agreement. They can intentionally limit the scope of inspections to avoid giving too much access to military information. In the U.S.-Soviet context, for example, the two sides often drafted highly precise inspection rules limiting what could be seen, how and when, while foregoing the ‘anytime anywhere’ inspection options. The possibility of a U.S. violation of the JCPOA suggests Iran might actually prefer to accept the burden of inspections — up to a point — rather than allowing a more powerful adversary to rely on its own determinations. But Iran’s openness has limits, and the JCPOA provisions (which go further than U.S.-Russia agreements and indeed most arms control cases) are likely close to the line. U.S. demands for more access could backfire into the deal breaking down, leaving no access at all.”