This week, sectarian violence in post-Assad Syria came to a head with another cycle of violence between Druze militias and Bedouin tribes in the Druze-majority Sweida region of southern Syria. Ahmed al-Sharaa, the new interim president of Syria, deployed his forces to restore order and they clashed with Druze armed groups. More than 300 deaths have been reported thus far, and the Syrian government has committed to holding the perpetrators accountable. The Druze minority in Syria distrusts the new government and perceives the military intervention in southern Syria as a defense of the Bedouin and attack on the Druze. Roughly 1,000 Druze Israelis crossed into Syria from the Golan Heights in solidarity with their fellow Druze.
Israel is conducting airstrikes in Syria as part of its commitment to Druze Israelis, and to prevent a buildup of hostile forces near its border and violent spillover into Israel. However, the IDF has also taken the highly escalatory step of striking Syria’s Defense Ministry and presidential palace in Damascus, which could have profound implications for Syria’s long-term stability. The Syrian government condemned the Israeli attack, which killed at least three people and injured 34 others, as a “blatant violation of the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic.”
Meanwhile, residents of Sweida are sheltering at home, many without electricity and unable to flee, while hospitals are running out of medical supplies. Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized the latest escalation as a “direct threat to efforts to help build a peaceful and stable Syria,” and US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack confirmed that “we told the Israelis to stand down and take a breath.” The Trump Administration is pushing for a ceasefire, hoping to thwart regional destabilization and return the parties to the negotiating table.
Israel and Syria have been holding “advanced talks” focused on security issues and the possibility of Syria-Israel normalization. There has been much speculation about these bilateral negotiations, including a report that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa are expected to meet at the White House in September to sign a security agreement as a first step to normalization.
President Trump has expressed a desire for Syria to join the Abraham Accords and Special Envoy Barrack is hoping to broker the deal. There is also reporting that Trump is offering Prime Minister Netanyahu normalization with Syria in exchange for ending the war in Gaza. Barrack has cautioned that President Al-Sharaa “cannot be seen by his own people to be forced or coerced into the Abraham Accords,” and “so he has to work slowly.” Meanwhile, leadership on both sides have publicly demonstrated an openness to ending hostilities. Most recently, Netanyahu during his visit to Washington this week, said that the new Syrian government “presents opportunities for stability, for security, and eventually for peace.” For his part, Al-Sharaa in a recent interview with the Jewish Journal proclaimed that “the era of endless tit-for-tat bombings must end.”
Al-Sharaa also emphasized the importance of the Golan Heights – which Israel captured from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War and annexed in 1981 – and insisted that the safety of the Druze community there is “non-negotiable.” Regarding the final status of the Golan, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently affirmed that the territory “will remain part of the State of Israel” in any peace agreement with Syria. According to one US official, border delineation and the future of Israeli-occupied Syrian territory is “up to them, not up to us.”
Another point of contention is the threat to Israel posed by Turkey’s growing influence in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime in December of last year. Turkey has sought to fill the void left by Iran and Russia, allies of former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, through increasing Turkish military presence in Syria. In pursuit of regional hegemony, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is directly challenging Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian airspace, used by Israel to counter Iranian proxy activities.
On June 30, President Trump issued Executive Order 14312 “Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions.” The new EO rescinded most US sanctions imposed on Syria since the 1970s, while maintaining sanctions on Bashar al-Assad and his associates, ISIS and its affiliates, Iranian proxy groups, human rights abusers, and other criminals (including those linked to weapons of mass destruction).
Trump announced this decision at a Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Riyadh back in May, ordering the “cessation of sanctions against Syria to give them a fresh start” after the fall of Assad. While in Saudi Arabia, Trump also met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa – the first such meeting in 25 years – and subsequently revealed that the US is “exploring normalizing relations with Syria.”
Following this announcement, the State Department issued an initial 180-day sanctions waiver and the Treasury Department issued a general license authorizing certain transactions with Syria. Upon the issuance of EO 14312 last month, the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control implemented the termination of the Syria sanctions program by removing 518 individuals and entities from the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. The US sanctions remaining in place “are a tool to promote accountability for Assad, his cronies, and others who seek to destabilize Syria or the region,” according to State.
Crucially, while Trump’s EO recognizes the “fundamental change” in Syria over the past six months and “positive actions” taken by the new Syrian government, the White House explained that the US remains committed to accountability for the Assad regime, addressing foreign terrorism in Syria (including Palestinian terrorism), preventing a resurgence of ISIS and assuming responsibility for ISIS prisons, as well as advancing Syria-Israel normalization. During a White House meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, Trump claimed that the Israeli prime minister requested the lifting of US sanctions against Syria.
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani called US sanctions relief an “historic turning point” that will enable his country’s “reconstruction and development.” On July 7, Secretary Rubio announced another “important step” in Syria’s postwar recovery: Under “Sec. 8 Counterterrorism Designations” of EO 14312, the Trump Administration revoked the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (or Al-Nusra Front) – the Sunni Islamist group formerly led by Al-Sharaa.
No opportunity comes without risk – and risks both to and from the new government remain considerable. President Al-Sharaa’s Islamist roots and association with terrorist organizations initially slowed the West’s embrace of him, even as he deposed Assad’s ruthless, terror-supporting regime. While Al-Sharaa has made considerable moves to greater inclusivity and transparency in the interim, his ability to unify the Syrian security forces remains questionable and violence has flared with former Assad loyalists, the Druze community, and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Israel, in particular, has well-founded concerns over newly intensifying instability along its border – including over the Golan. Likewise, after decades of oppressive rule and crippling sanctions, it is unclear whether the new Syrian government can succeed in delivering services for its population and restructuring the economy to enable growth. Amidst this considerable uncertainty, though, lies a moment of historic opportunity for all three countries that may yet not be realized, but will almost certainly vaporize if not seized upon very quickly.
Acknowledging that Syria’s path ahead is unlikely to be linear, a policy decision to expand engagement with the Al-Sharaa government should be based on an embrace of the opportunities and qualified acceptance that some backsliding and/or security lapses are likely inevitable along the way. While a difficult prospect for an Israeli population exhausted by near constant conflict, the long-term payoff almost certainly outweighs the risks as they currently exist. With reports that a meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Al-Sharaa could occur as early as September, key actions that could be offered as part of the operationalization of that long-term vision include: