The humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip has improved significantly since the October ceasefire, but challenges remain. The massive destruction of critical infrastructure and agricultural production, alongside two years of limited access to food, water, and medicine, will affect Gaza’s population for years to come. Among the notable humanitarian challenges facing Gaza’s civilians are the following:
In March 2025, Israel introduced new registration requirements for international NGOs (INGOs) and transferred authority over the registration process to the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, which has taken a hardline stance towards INGOs. The new rules require INGOs to provide sensitive personal data on Palestinian staff to the Israeli government, including names, ID numbers, and, in some cases, residential addresses. Israel argues this information is necessary to ensure aid organizations are not infiltrated by Hamas or other militant groups. The requirements also authorize the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs to deny registration to any INGO deemed to be “delegitimizing” the state of Israel – referring to ideological criticisms of Israel, such as the accusation of genocide or deliberate use of siege tactics, or expressions of support for legal proceedings against Israelis in foreign or international courts.
In late December 2025, the Israeli government began enforcing the new requirements, approving the registration of 24 INGOs, mostly faith-based organizations, while informing 37 non-compliant INGOs – including such major humanitarian actors as Doctors Without Borders, International Rescue Committee, and Mercy Corps – that their authorization to operate in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem had expired, and that they must cease their operations by March 1, 2026 unless they comply with the new terms. Several other organizations, including Save the Children, had their applications formally rejected but continue to operate in Gaza.
According to the Israeli government, the 37 non-compliant INGOs failed to complete their applications by refusing to submit complete lists of their Palestinian employees. Most INGOs have objected to this requirement, noting several key objections:
Some international organizations have sought to work out compromises with the Israeli authorities, seeking to limit the number of employees for whom personal information is provided and to outline an explicitly defined vetting process, or to rely on third-party vetting and the establishment of donor-audited compliance mechanisms. To date, the Israeli government has declined to engage in substantive discussions that would alter the requirements.
The Israeli government is refusing to make any adjustments to its requirements and is seeking to minimize the negative consequences of the deregistration by propagating two myths:
Reality: INGOs deliver and provide a substantial share of life-saving aid inside Gaza, including:
Once an aid truck enters Gaza, the contents need to be delivered to a warehouse or distribution point, and humanitarian services themselves must be provided to the most vulnerable populations. The delivery and provision of humanitarian aid requires specialized and technical personnel, as well as deep community trust and integration, which INGOs and their personnel have built up over many years. For example, Doctors Without Borders is the second largest medical provider in the Strip, running or supporting over 20 percent of the remaining hospital beds in Gaza, and delivering one in three childbirths. Forcing these organizations to cease their operations, therefore, will worsen the humanitarian crisis in Gaza severely.
Reality: Replacing humanitarian organizations with private contractors was the logic behind the failed effort of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which resulted in hundreds of Palestinian civilian casualties and was ultimately scrapped once the ceasefire went into effect. In a complex security environment such as Gaza, where the population so desperately needs humanitarian relief at scale across multiple sectors, providing aid requires technical expertise, local relationships based on trust and community acceptance, and a public perception of neutrality.
The 37 affected organizations are currently reviewing their legal options, seeking diplomatic support (including from the US), and developing contingency plans for maintaining operations to the extent possible after March 1, even without registration. However, such efforts would be complicated and perhaps impossible as the organizations would lose access to functions that are crucial for their services, including:
Since the October 11, 2025, ceasefire, the quantity of goods entering the Gaza Strip has increased dramatically. According to the United Nations monitoring mechanism, the average number of trucks entering Gaza has increased at least threefold compared to the period before the ceasefire. Food trucks account for two-thirds of the commodities transferred into Gaza during the post-ceasefire period, with trucks carrying shelter and WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene) accounting for most of the rest.
The January 2 UN Gaza Humanitarian Response Report states that for the first time since October 2023, food assistance has been meeting 100 percent of caloric needs for Gaza’s population. As a result, concerns about widespread famine have diminished. Still, there are pockets of food insecurity in sections of the Strip, particularly for the most vulnerable. Notably, the consequences of the reduced food intake over an extended period of time will take months if not years to reverse.
Israel’s continued assault on UNRWA’s ability to operate in Gaza and the West Bank has included:
Despite the existing legal obstacles, UNRWA continues to operate.
UNRWA believes that the legislation applies only to territory Israel defines as sovereign, so while it will most certainly impact its operations in East Jerusalem – already resulting in the demolition of its headquarters and the likely further closure of offices and schools – its impact in Gaza and the West Bank is less clear.
In December 2025, the United Nations renewed UNRWA’s mandate for the next three years, with the overwhelming majority of member states voting in favor of the renewal. However, the organization is facing a severe financial crunch; on January 5, 2026, it announced the dismissal of 571 employees in Gaza, and additional cuts are anticipated.
The Rafah crossing served as a transit point between Gaza and Egypt until October 2023. Following October 7, access through Rafah was highly restricted, and the Israeli military seized the crossing in May 2024. Since then, except for a short period during the early 2025 ceasefire, neither people nor goods have been able to cross through Rafah.
Nickolay Mladenov, the Board of Peace’s High Representative for Gaza, has announced that the crossing will open next week, as per Point 8 of the October ceasefire plan. This remains subject to approval by hardliners in Israel’s security cabinet, and it remains unclear what the monitoring protocol will be for the crossing.
Still, opening the crossing is likely to allow for some relief, including:
Despite this relief, if Israel continues to insist that humanitarian goods enter only through Israeli crossings (primarily nearby Kerem Shalom), the opening of the crossing by itself will not dramatically transform the humanitarian situation.