This weekend, growing international pressure and, for the first time, even increasing alarm in the Israeli media caused Israel’s government to take some initial steps that will hopefully begin to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. However, on the much bigger question of ending the war, truly alleviating the suffering of Palestinians, and getting the hostages out, the Israeli government and its supporters continue to argue that three barriers stand in the way:
All three of these claims range from half truths to total falsehoods. There is much more Israel can do to get the hostages out and get aid into Gaza. And the reality is that at this point the only pathway to defeating Hamas is through political and security mechanisms that can replace it – not more military force. Let’s break these myths down in detail.
It is true that Hamas is a terrible terrorist organization that committed horrific atrocities on October 7 and continues to repress the people of Gaza. Hamas should return all of the hostages tomorrow.
It is also true that nearly two years into the war, the Netanyahu government has still refused to make a very simple and direct offer – all of the hostages for an end to the war. This is despite the fact that in the latest polls, 74 percent of the Israeli public supports such a deal while only 8 percent support Netanyahu’s approach of partial hostage deals for temporary ceasefires. 12 percent of Israelis want to continue the war no matter what, but unfortunately those 12 percent include Itamar Ben-Gvir and Betzalel Smotrich who could bring down Netanyahu’s coalition if he ended the war.
Hamas’ position has long been that it wants a guaranteed end to the war as part of a hostage deal. Even if Netanyahu were to make such an offer there would still be difficult negotiations involved and Hamas’ position may change. They have certainly not negotiated in good faith throughout this process. But until an Israeli government makes this offer, it is false to claim that the war is being dragged on only by Hamas’ obstinance.
It’s worth taking a moment to understand the history. After an initial ceasefire in November 2023 during which 105 hostages were released, the issue of ending the war became a major hang up. Hamas wanted an end to the war as part of any deal. Israel was not willing to offer that, and the Israeli public was not supportive of such an offer. In May 2024, Israel offered a multi-step framework whereby there would be an initial hostage deal and ceasefire – during that time the parties would negotiate on the terms of ending the war and getting all of the remaining hostages out. President Biden publicly embraced this plan and Hamas accepted the overall framework in July 2024. It took another six months to get to a ceasefire in January of 2025.
Unfortunately, during the ceasefire Netanyahu refused to ever seriously engage on the second part of the agreement, which would have ended the war in exchange for all of the hostages. Israel ultimately chose to unilaterally restart the war in mid-March with more than 50 hostages still remaining in Gaza. The Trump Administration simply returned to the old formula: temporary hostage deal during which discussions could continue on an end to the war. Unsurprisingly, having been burned once, Hamas has refused to take this deal a second time.
What’s even more important is the political context has fundamentally changed. The Israeli public gets it. They realize the war is not doing Israel any good anymore. People are sick of having their loved ones called up again and again for reserve duty and being sent to Gaza, when it is so crystal clear that there is no endgame or strategy for actually getting rid of Hamas. Netanyahu has all the political space he needs to make an offer to end the war – except for the fact that it will bring down his ruling coalition. So, he continues to make these partial offers that he knows are likely to fail and then he, the Trump Administration, and all of their supporters can just blame Hamas while the suffering in Gaza continues and the hostages languish.
Starting in May, the Israeli government implemented a new system for the distribution of aid, run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation in collaboration with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). It replaced the UN system of many distribution sites in Gaza with only four locations. The rationale was that this would prevent aid from being siphoned off by Hamas, but from the beginning this proposal was bound to be a disaster. A system of only four sites to feed millions of people, far away from population centers, requiring people to walk through combat zones, into a militarized environment that included IDF soldiers, American contractors, other Gaza gangs and elements of Hamas nearby was an obvious recipe for disaster that many of us warned about.
Moreover, as the New York Times has reported, there is very little evidence of actual diversion of aid by Hamas. I’m skeptical that the answer is that zero aid is being diverted for Hamas’ benefit. But even if some is, the question is how you weigh that concern versus the importance of feeding Gaza’s population. For me, feeding the 2.2 million people and roughly 1 million children who live in Gaza is so much more important than addressing the comparatively minor issue of aid diversion. Unfortunately, the Israeli government doesn’t see it that way.
The second claim is that the UN on its own could send all of its trucks into Gaza and feed the population. It is true that the relationship between the UN and international aid organizations on the one side and the IDF on the other is toxic. There is fault here on both sides and international aid providers and the people of Gaza would be better served if they could engage more constructively with the IDF. However, to claim that the UN could just magically get this food into Gaza without Israeli cooperation is ridiculous. The IDF needs to work with the UN on de-confliction routes so that UN aid providers don’t end up getting killed trying to get aid in. The Israeli military also needs to provide access to roads that don’t go through the heart of Palestinian population centers. If the UN is forced to drive through the heart of population centers with large convoys, that just leads to looting by a combination of desperate people, but also precisely the actors that are diverting aid. Israel also has very specific restrictions on how aid can and cannot go in and the type of truck aid can go in on. From my understanding, none of that cooperation was happening once the GHF system was set up making it impossible for the UN to get food in. Hopefully, that now begins to change with the welcome announcement by Israel that it will create humanitarian corridors and have temporary ceasefires.
Finally, there is the question of what actually is the most effective way to prevent food diversion and the answer from previous conflicts is that the best solution is the opposite of what GHF is doing. Israel should flood the zone with a lot of aid – not restrict it. The guys with the guns in a conflict zone are always going to get enough food as they’ll just take it by force from others. The question is whether they can control the food distribution system and then use the black market to make a lot of money off the food and use that money to buy other things they need more and to wield power. The best answer is to actually flood the market with food, cause prices to crash and ruin the business model. It’s not only the moral thing to do, but it’s also the best way to counter Hamas. It also has the added benefit of giving Israel the moral high ground instead of causing it to be internationally isolated, while Hamas cynically takes advantage of the anger the international community is directing towards Israel.
I’ve written about this a number of times, but there is no strictly military solution to defeat Hamas. The only way to replace Hamas is with a credible alternative that can hold territory and govern Gaza. As Americans have learned the hard way in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, if you don’t develop an alternative, you just end up in a game of whack-a-mole – going back again and again to the same territory, as the enemy hides or moves and then comes back. That is exactly what has been happening in Gaza for nearly two years now and the Israeli public has grown weary of it.
It was precisely these lessons that led to efforts by the Biden Administration early in the war to develop a strategy to actually have an alternative for the day after. We quickly concluded that the most viable option was a temporary Arab-led force with Palestinian participation from the start, spearheaded by Egypt, that would eventually be handed over time back to the Palestinian Authority (PA). This was an imperfect solution – they always are in these situations. There are real questions about what the Arab states are willing to do and the PA is a deeply flawed institution in much need of reform. But still, these were the best options. However, Netanyahu refused to ever seriously engage on these ideas because having Palestinians rule Gaza in the aftermath was anathema to Smotrich and Ben-Gvir who have an agenda of ethnically cleansing Gaza and settling it with Israelis. So this plan would have brought down the Israeli coalition.
Sadly, chances of this working now have probably dropped significantly. But still, this remains the best option for Israel, instead of continuing a war that is making no difference at this point in removing Hamas, causing increased suffering for Palestinians, failing to bring the hostages home, undermining Israeli legitimacy abroad, and wearing down Israeli society and the IDF as they continue with one deployment after another.