Restoring the Iran Deal

Prior to Donald Trump’s violation and abandonment of the JCPOA, Iran had taken all the steps that they were required to take in order to block all pathways to developing a nuclear weapon. The core of the Arak plutonium reactor had been removed and filled with concrete. 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium had been shipped out of the country. ⅔ of installed centrifuges had been physically removed. Iran had provided inspectors access to its nuclear facilities and supply chain.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with monitoring and inspecting Iran’s nuclear facilities to ensure that they are complying with the deal – utilizing the unprecedentedly thorough and sophisticated inspections mechanisms and technology that the deal put into place. Prior to Trump’s unilateral violation of the deal, the IAEA had repeatedly certified that Iran was compliant.

No. The deal is designed to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Non-nuclear behaviors are separate – which is why the US has and can continue to use a wide range of tactics and sanctions to confront and penalize Iran over its support for terror, human rights violations and missile development. In fact, Congress passed new non-nuclear sanctions on Iran prior to Trump’s violation and abandonment of the agreement.

It is important to note, however, that some proposed pieces of legislation in recent years have aimed to violate or undermine the JCPOA by reimposing key nuclear sanctions under the guise of confronting non-nuclear behavior. That’s a dangerous tactic that we have to watch out for.

The agreement never expires or sunsets. The agreement contains some time-limited restrictions on certain Iranian nuclear activity, but its prohibition on Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon and Iran’s submission to an aggressive inspections and monitoring regime are permanent.

Specifically, the agreement establishes strict limits on advanced centrifuge R&D, testing and deployment in the first 10 years and, after the initial 10 year period, Iran must continue to limit enrichment to a level that is consistent with a peaceful nuclear program. Certain transparency measures will last for 15 years, others for 20 to 25 years and some will last forever, namely its obligations under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.

This deal in no way authorizes, allows or encourages future Iranian nuclear weapons activity, which will always be prohibited under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If Iran ever acts to pursue a nuclear weapon in violation of the agreement, the United States and its allies retain their ability to respond with any number of diplomatic and military options. And thanks to the agreement, America and its partners are now in a better position to thwart any break-out attempt, given the unparalleled understanding and awareness of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure that the deal has already provided.

We don’t trust Iran – and this agreement leaves nothing to trust. It is based on unprecedented verification, with the strictest inspections in Iran’s history. It includes 24/7 monitoring of Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, including Natanz, Fordow and Arak. International inspectors have access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain – its uranium mines and mills; its conversion facility; its centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities; and its other declared nuclear sites. As a result, Iran would need to construct an entire covert supply chain to pursue a covert nuclear weapons program. The IAEA can also request access to any undeclared sites within 24 days, and Iran, Russia and China do not have a veto over that right, or over moves to punish Iran if it refuses.

There is no such thing – it is a semantic debate about a term that does not exist in arms control circles or at the IAEA. There are currently no countries that grant “anytime, anywhere” inspections to the IAEA nor has any country ever agreed to such a condition. What is important and undeniable is that inspectors have the access they need, when and where they need it. Iran’s nuclear facilities are monitored 24/7. Without a deal, international inspectors would be granted little or no access to any sites, while Iran’s nuclear program proceeds unmonitored and unrestricted.