Six Months In: Assessing the Status of the Gaza Ceasefire

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Six months after the October 10, 2025 announcement of a Gaza ceasefire, the 20-point peace plan announced by President Trump has largely stalled on all its promises beyond the initial pause in fighting, hostage exchange, and surge in humanitarian aid. This memo analyzes where things stand on each of the seven key pillars outlined in the plan:

1. Ending the Fighting and Releasing the Hostages
2. Unimpeded Surge of Humanitarian Aid
3. Establishing a Governance and Security Alternative to Hamas
4. Disarming Hamas
5. Israeli Withdrawal
6. Reconstruction
7. Progress Toward Palestinian Statehood

Executive Summary

• End of Fighting: Hostilities have reduced dramatically, but attacks by both sides have violated the ceasefire. More than 700 Palestinians and four Israelis have been killed in Gaza since October 10, 2025.
• Humanitarian Aid: The humanitarian situation in Gaza has improved significantly, but remains dire. 77 percent of the population still faces acute food insecurity, and severe shortages in medical supplies, fuel, and shelter materials persist, largely due to Israeli restrictions on items classified as “dual-use,” including temporary shelters.
• Governance and Security Alternative: Despite the creation of the Board of Peace and a 15-person committee of Palestinian technocrats to govern Gaza, Hamas retains control of 46 percent of the Strip, while Israel controls the rest. The 15-person committee has not entered Gaza and has yet to establish any authority on the ground.
• Disarming Hamas: Hamas has rejected the Board of Peace’s proposed sequenced disarmament plan, conditioning any disarmament on Israel first halting military operations in Gaza and allowing the full entry of humanitarian aid – obligations the group insists Israel already committed to under the October 10, 2025 ceasefire. Hamas is also demanding international guarantees that Israel will fulfill its obligations under any disarmament agreement. Negotiations on this issue continue.
• Israeli Withdrawal: Israel has not conducted any further withdrawals since the initial pullback on October 10. The IDF is building additional fortifications along the ceasefire line and reinforcing its existing positions.
• Reconstruction: Progress on reconstruction has barely begun. Just 0.5 percent of rubble has been cleared and the vast majority of funding pledges by donor states have not been transferred to the World Bank-administered fund for Gaza reconstruction. Most disbursements are conditional on Hamas disarming and further Israeli withdrawal.
• Palestinian Statehood: There has been no meaningful progress since the ceasefire was announced. The Palestinian Authority is extremely weak financially and politically, further losing legitimacy among Palestinians in the West Bank as settler violence increases and the PA appears impotent in protecting Palestinians.

  I. Ending the Fighting and Releasing the Hostages 

Initial Withdrawal and Hostage Exchange

• All 20 living Israeli hostages in Gaza were released within three days of the ceasefire. The last body of the 28 deceased Israeli hostages, Ran Gvili, was recovered by the IDF on January 26, 2026.
• Israel released approximately 1,950 living Palestinian prisoners and the bodies of 360 during the initial days following the ceasefire.
• Israel has withdrawn from about half of Gaza and now controls an estimated 54 percent of the territory. Hamas has consolidated control over the other 46 percent.

Suspension of Military Operations 

In violation of the commitment to suspend all military operations, both sides have engaged in intermittent exchanges of fire:

Hamas attacks, carried out by fighters who remained in tunnels on the Israeli-controlled side, have intermittently targeted Israeli soldiers. Four Israeli soldiers have been killed in such attacks since the ceasefire began, and several have been wounded.

Israeli attacks since the ceasefire began have fallen into three categories:

• Gunfire at Palestinians attempting to cross the ceasefire line.
• Airstrikes carried out following attacks on Israeli soldiers, characterized by the IDF as retaliatory.
• Targeted airstrikes against Hamas leaders, fighters, and police officers, not in direct response to Hamas attacks.

In total, Israeli fire has killed more than 700 Palestinians since the ceasefire took effect.

II. Unimpeded Surge of Humanitarian Aid 

Conditions Improved, but Severe Israeli Restrictions on Aid Remain

The quantity of goods entering the Gaza Strip increased dramatically in the months following the ceasefire, leading food staple prices to stabilize. However, as a result of the US-Israel war with Iran, Israel closed one of its two crossings into Gaza from February 28 until April 13, leading to lower volumes of aid entering Gaza and an increase in market prices. Overall, the needs of the majority of the population remain overwhelming due to shortages in basic necessities – many of which are caused by continued Israeli restrictions:

• The vast majority of the population remains in refugee tent camps: 1.7 million people are sheltering in approximately 1,600 refugee camp clusters. Conditions in these camps are dire, with vermin, parasites, and fleas transmitting diseases. Items critical for the construction of better temporary shelters, including tent poles, remain banned by Israel.
• Acute food insecurity: While the threat of starvation has receded, 77 percent of the population continues to face acute food insecurity, and 3,700 children still require treatment for malnutrition.
• Medicine and medical supply shortages persist, including critical medical equipment such as cancer treatments, incubators, ventilators, and ultrasound machines. According to the United Nations, these shortages are driven largely by Israeli restrictions on the importation of items classified as “dual-use.”
• More than 18,000 patients – including 11,000 cancer patients – require urgent medical treatment but have been unable to evacuate. Since the Rafah crossing reopened on February 2, 2026, fewer than 400 patients have been allowed to leave Gaza.
• Aid diversion levels are very low: Since the ceasefire started, just 0.5 percent of all collected aid has been intercepted, with no new cargo interceptions reported since early November 2025. In the months before the ceasefire, up to 80 percent was being diverted, largely by armed gangs.
• A majority of Gaza’s children are not receiving any education. Ongoing Israeli restrictions on the import of educational materials, including notebooks, pencils, and textbooks, remain a significant challenge. Another constraint is that many schools continue to be used as shelters for displaced individuals.

Rehabilitation of Gaza’s Critical Infrastructure Has Been Limited

A significant number of bakeries and kitchens have been rehabilitated. They are producing more than five times more bread than before the ceasefire. However, progress in other areas has been limited:

• Gaza’s electricity grid has been down since October 2023 and the entire Strip remains dependent on fuel-powered generators.
• Only 42 percent of health service points are functioning and medical supplies remain scarce.
• Efforts to restore Gaza’s agricultural capacity have been stymied by IDF control over the areas where such activity is feasible.
• Lack of wastewater management remains a severe challenge and has triggered a spike in diseases. All six wastewater treatment plants and 85 percent of the sewage pumping stations are out of service, so sewage is either flowing in the open or is discharged into the sea. Continued restrictions on “dual-use” construction materials and water pumps have prevented their reconstruction.

Israeli Obstruction of International NGOs’ Activities Has Continued

United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which provide the vast majority of humanitarian assistance, remain subject to severe restrictions on the entry of humanitarian goods, and Israeli authorities have approved fewer than 50 percent of requested movements.

Israel has also denied registration to 37 INGOs that either refused to provide sensitive personal data on Palestinian staff or were deemed excessively antagonistic towards Israel. In response to an INGO petition, the Israeli High Court postponed implementation of the deregistration order, which was scheduled to go into effect on March 1, pending further negotiations between the Israeli government and the INGOs – as of April 14, no agreement has been reached and the High Court is expected to issue a final decision in the coming weeks.

INGOs deliver and provide a substantial share of life-saving aid inside Gaza, including:

• The delivery of more than half of food aid;
• Support for 60 percent of field hospitals;
• Nearly 75 percent of shelter assistance; and
• Treatment for children with severe acute malnutrition.

Restricting INGOs’ activities further would certainly have severe humanitarian consequences. Israel’s argument that registered INGOs and private contractors can fill the gap is simply not credible.

III. Establishing a Governance and Security Alternative to Hamas 

The Board of Peace and the Palestinian technocratic committee (NCAG) were established and named in January 2026, but neither body is operational on the ground in Gaza. 

The Board of Peace is chaired by President Trump, who has sweeping authority over its operations. The Board appointed Nikolay Mladenov, a Bulgarian diplomat and former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, to serve as the Director-General and High Representative for Gaza with responsibility for overseeing NCAG and for supervising progress on humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Gaza.

The 15-person NCAG is headed by Ali Shaath, a former PA minister. Its members are all originally from Gaza and most have worked with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the past. None of the committee’s members has been allowed into Gaza, and there is no clear timeline for when this will change. The Committee is also facing severe financial shortages, reportedly even unable to purchase computers for its members. Gazans who hoped that NCAG might provide for a transition from Hamas control are increasingly frustrated by its lack of presence and seeming impotence.

Mladenov has outlined five conditions that must be met for the NCAG to become effective:

• Transfer of control over civilian institutions from Hamas to the NCAG. Hamas has stated it is prepared to allow this to happen.
• No more ceasefire violations by Israel and Hamas. 
• Radical increase in aid that meaningfully changes the quality of life for Gaza’s population.
• Availability of adequate financial resources. At the inaugural Board of Peace meeting on February 19, approximately $17 billion was pledged: $10 billion from the U.S. and $7 billion from nine countries including the UAE ($1.2B), Saudi Arabia ($1B), Kuwait ($1B), and Qatar ($1B). However, the Saudis have indicated that the Gulf countries will only transfer funds once there is agreement on Hamas decommissioning its weapons and Israel withdrawing from Gaza.
• An agreed framework on disarming Hamas (see below).

International Stabilization Force (ISF)

The International Stabilization Force (ISF) is still in the early stages of recruitment. Despite the central role outlined for the force, efforts to recruit and deploy international troops, and to define the ISF’s precise mandate and rules of engagement, have proved challenging. At present, U.S. Army Major General Jasper Jeffers has been appointed ISF commander, and five countries have committed troops – Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania.

The vetted Palestinian police force is also still in the recruitment stage. Mladenov announced the launch of recruitment for a transitional Palestinian police force, reporting that 2,000 applications had been received within hours. A key outstanding question is the status of the existing Hamas-controlled police force, which currently maintains order and secures aid convoys on the Hamas-controlled side of Gaza. However, absent an agreement with Hamas to disarm, it is difficult to see an alternative police force taking charge.

IV. Disarming Hamas

Disarming Hamas is the pivot point for progress on three other key areas covered in this memo: the deployment of the NCAG, Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and meaningful progress on reconstruction.

The Board of Peace’s latest disarmament proposal, which Hamas has rejected, outlines the following sequenced approach:

• Weapons that can threaten Israel – such as rockets and heavy munitions – would be handed over first. Light arms belonging to individual fighters would be addressed later through a buy-back program offering amnesty and financial incentives, at which point Israeli-supported militias would also be disarmed.
• Israel would carry out a sequenced withdrawal alongside the sequence of Hamas disarming.
• The NCAG would assume security control of Gaza through an internationally-trained Palestinian police force.
• Meaningful reconstruction proceeds only after Hamas is fully disarmed and Israel completely withdraws.

Hamas’ Reasoning

While Hamas rejected the proposal, it is reportedly open to giving up its heavy weapons as part of a disarmament plan that includes an Israeli withdrawal and commitment to not resume the war. The sticking point on negotiations remains Hamas’ refusal to commit to giving up its small arms and its insistence on an international guarantee for Israeli compliance with its obligations under the 20-point plan – no resumption of hostilities, further withdrawals, full humanitarian access, and initiation of reconstruction. The United States is holding direct talks with Hamas on these issues.

V. Israeli Withdrawal

Given the absence of an ISF deployment and the failure of Hamas to disarm, Israel contends that it is not obliged to withdraw the IDF from Gaza. Once the ISF does deploy, negotiations regarding the precise contours and timing of the IDF withdrawal are likely to be highly contentious. In the interim, Israel has established seven new outposts and extensive earth berms along the ceasefire line that divides Gaza.

The Plan’s Alternative Option

The plan states explicitly that the IDF is supposed to hand over territory to the ISF even if Hamas does not cooperate on disarming and handing over authority. The implementation of the provision, however, faces two challenges:

1. The ISF and alternative Palestinian police force are not close to being deployable, so there is no force to whom territory can be handed over.
2. Israel has so far insisted it will not withdraw from Gaza until Hamas is fully disarmed. This casts doubt on the option that Israel would hand over territory if Hamas continues to reject proposals.

VI. Reconstruction

More than 80 percent of all buildings in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed – generating approximately 61 million tonnes of rubble – and 90 percent of Gaza’s population is currently living in tents in the midst of that rubble. However, according to the UNDP, only approximately 0.5 percent of the total rubble has been cleared. The UNDP assesses that the following conditions are necessary to accelerate the rubble-clearing process, none of which currently exist:

• Unimpeded access to destroyed sites.
• Permits for heavy machinery and specialized equipment that Israel currently restricts.
• Consistent fuel entry. 
• A stable security environment.

Similarly, little progress has been made with respect to reconstruction to date due to several factors:

• There is no clear authority responsible for coordinating the reconstruction efforts – as noted above, the NCAG is not yet present on the ground.
• Gaza’s reconstruction is estimated to cost $70 billion but only $17 billion has been pledged and almost all of that has yet to be made available for disbursement. Key donor states, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar insist they will not release their donations until Hamas disarms and they are confident that war will not resume.
• Restrictions on the import of reconstruction materials.
  • Israel continues to classify essential construction inputs – cement, steel, and heavy machinery – as “dual-use” materials, severely restricting their entry into Gaza.
  • Under the disarmament plan presented by Mladenov, the lifting of dual-use restrictions and permission for full-scale reconstruction would only come after the process of decommissioning Hamas’ arms is underway.

Existing Reconstruction Efforts

Despite challenges associated with the greater reconstruction project overseen by the Board of Peace, there has been some limited progress.

With assistance from Gulf states and other actors, including Turkey, Hamas is working to rehabilitate areas under its control. The group has been clearing debris, restoring infrastructure, roads, and public buildings, and attempting to rebuild residential neighborhoods where possible, subject to the restrictions described above.

On the Israeli-controlled side, the Trump administration has pushed the concept of “alternative safe communities,” temporary residential compounds in areas under IDF control, each housing 20,000 to 25,000 Gazans, with medical clinics and schools at each site. It remains unclear how many Palestinians would want to live under Israeli military control, and whether residents would be free to move between the side of Gaza that Hamas controls and these communities.
In January 2026, Jared Kushner presented a “master plan” for a “New Gaza” featuring skyscrapers and seaside resorts, but experts have dismissed the plan as unrealistic even as a starting point for a planning exercise.

VII. Progress Toward Palestinian Statehood

PA Capacity and Legitimacy at an All-Time Low

Despite some progress on technocratic reforms, the PA is experiencing a severe financial, legitimacy, and capacity crisis:

• The PA’s financial crisis is driven in large part by Israel’s continued withholding of tax revenues and customs duties it collects on the PA’s behalf. As a result, services traditionally provided by the PA in the health, education, water, and electricity sectors are less available to West Bank residents in quantity and quality.
• The PA’s legitimacy is greatly diminished by the upsurge in settler violence, which is increasingly resulting in the deaths of Palestinian civilians living in the West Bank and the destruction of their property.
• The Board of Peace has sought to marginalize the PA from involvement with the Gaza reconstruction process. However, NCAG is coordinating with PA officials and, as stated by NCAG Chair Shaath, envisions “the need for Palestinians to unite under one system, one law, and one president.”

Elections

A key aspect of the PA’s legitimacy crisis is the fact that national elections have not been held since 2006. President Abbas promised national elections within one year of a ceasefire, but this remains unlikely because of the practical challenges of organizing credible elections under present circumstances.

Municipal elections are nevertheless scheduled to take place on April 25 in the West Bank. While they will highlight the significant administrative capabilities of the Central Election Commission and provide a limited opportunity for Palestinian political expression, their broader political impact is likely to be limited.

Palestinian statehood remains the expressed goal of a majority of the international community; however, without an explicit endorsement from the United States and a concerted effort to strengthen Palestinian institutions, efforts to promote Palestinian independence will languish.